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wise even under this rule, the master will not be liable.1 5 So in Norm-
ington v. Neely" the court held that it was necessary to find that the
assault was a continuation of an occurrence which was within the scope
of employment, and that after a taxi driver had checked in for the night,
and then attended the theatre, the employer was not liable for an assault
committed upon meeting a competing taxi driver, although the assault
arose out of a quarrel which took place during working hours several
hours previously. And in Raben v. Hamilton Diamond Co." the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals sent a case back for retrial to determine whether
the agent had completed his work before or after the assault took place.
The facts in the principal case do not reveal the time intervening between
the conflict for precedence on the road and the assault upon the plaintiff,
and the absence of mention of the time factor indicates that it was viewed
by the court as immaterial, as long as the conflict preceded the assault.
If the intervening time was a matter of minutes rather than hours, the
court has apparently aligned itself with the majority rule.
F.F.V
CONFLICT OF LAWS
CONFLICTS - SALES -E FFECT OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
LAW ON OUT OF STATE CONDITIONAL SALE
One 'Velikson, on August 26, 1936, purchased an automobile from
the Goodman Co. in New York upon a conditional sales contract which
was duly recorded there. Later, the Union Commercial Corp. purchased
the Goodman Co.'s interest in the note. Welikson, in 1937, without the
consent or knowledge of the holder of the conditional sales contract
brought the car to Ohio where he had obtained employment. In Rich-
land County, Ohio, he filed a sworn statement of ownership with the
Clerk of Courts without mentioning the conditional sales contract.
Welikson then obtained an Ohio license. In January, 1938, he pur-
chased a new car and traded in the old one to the R. J. Schmunck Co.,
filing with the Clerk of Courts of Cuyahoga County an application and
certificate of title for the old car without disclosing the lien. A certif-
icate of title was issued him showing it free of all encumbrances and he,
in turn, assigned it to the R. J. Schmunck Co., which then had a new
certificate issued to it. On February 2, 1938, the Union Commercial
Corp. heard of the transaction and brought a replevin action, which
was decided in favor of the defendant in the Cleveland Municipal Court.
a'Richberger v. American Express Co., 73 Miss. x61, iS So. 9zz (xS96).
"Normington v. Neely, 58 Idaho 134, 70 P. (2d) 369 (1937).
'RPaben v. Hamilton Diamond Co., i9 Cal. App. (zd) zz, 6S P.(zd) 98 (1937).
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The Court of Appeals of the Eighth District, Cuyahoga County,
affirmed the decision' on the basis of the Certificate of Title Law relating
to automobiles which had become effective on January I, 1938,2 subse-
quent to the New York recording of the conditional sale. In previous de-
cisions, Ohio had held the Certificate of Title Law provided an exclusive
method for transfer of title.3 The majority opinion held in favor of the
Ohio bona fide purchaser inasmuch as the encumbrance was not noted
upon the certificate4 and decided that the New York recording did not
come within the one exception' to the Act for conditional sales and
chattel mortgages recorded prior to its passage under Ohio G.C. secs.
8560-8572. The court held that the Certificate of Title Law expressly
nullifies, with respect to automobiles, previous Ohio cases6 which had
followed the majority doctrine throughout the country in protecting
the interest of out-of-state conditional vendors without whose consent
or knowledge the chattel had been removed to a second state.' The
dissent argues that the act was not intended to apply to transactions
taking place outside the state and that the securing of the certificate
through fraud is no better than a theft, which is dearly provided for
by the act.'
The entire question of the rights of the out-of-state conditional
vendor seems to be one of policy rather than of power to control. The
problem does not arise until there has been a removal from state A to
state B without the consent or knowledge of the owner and some new
dealing or transaction with respect to the chattel in the new jursidiction.9
The majority in reaching its conclusion relies upon a case which does
not seem applicable to the facts involved,"0 and also relies upon a section
1 Union Commercial Corp. v. R. J. Schmunk Co., 30 Ohio L. Abs. iz6 (939).
'OHIO G.C. secs. 629o-2 to 6zgo-zo. This act relates only to automobiles. One
purpose was to prevent putting old cars scrapped by manufacturers and dealers back on
the road. Another purpose was to provide an exclusive method of transferring title.
'State ex rel. The City Loan and Savings Co. v. Taggart, Recorder, 134 Ohio St.
374, 17 N.E. (2d) 758 (938)0 O.S.L.J. z55.
Onio G. C. sec. 6290-4.
'OHIo G. C. sec. 6zgo-9.
6Kanaga v. Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134, 70 Am. Dec. 6z (1857); Reising v. Universal
Credit Company, 5o Ohio App. z8g, 198 N.E. 52 (1935).
7 Shapard v. Hynes, 45 C.C.A. 271, io4 Fed. 449, 52 L.R.A. 675 (goo); Baldwin
v. Hill, 4. Kans. App. z68, 46 Pac. 329 (1896); Drew v. Smith, 59 Me. 393 (1871)0;
National Bank of Commerce v. Morris, 114 Mo. 255, z S.W. i5; REFsrATzrs NT,
CONFLICT OF LAws sese. 268 and 275; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, sec. 153; STURR-
BERG, CONFLICT OF LAws, 364. Contra: Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers, xII Tex.
293, 231 S.W. 1072 (19z).
8 OHIO G. C. 6290-8.
Mere removal does not affect title. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs, (934)
sec. z6o (general), 266-67 (chattel mortgage) 273-274 (conditional sales), z8o (liens
and pledges).
1"Boyer v. M. D. Knowlton Co., 85 Ohio St. 104, 97 N.E. 137 (1g1). This case
refers to property purchased in New York to be shipped to Ohio and to be used in Ohio.
of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws which would not seem to
apply.
11
Valid argument from the standpoint of law and policy may be made
for both the majority and dissenting opinions. That the Legislature
intended the Certificate of Title to be an exclusive method of transfer-
ring title, so far as purely local transactions are concerned, seems rather
clear,'2 although some states have held that their acts were not intended
to be so confined." A more difficult problem arises, however, in
respect to legislative intent to regulate transactions occuring in other
states. The applicable sections do not specifically mention this problem
and so there is as much soundness in the dissent's argument that the
act was not intended to apply to such a situation, as in the majority's
that inasmuch as only one exception to the requirements is provided for,
and this situation is not included,' 4 it was not intended to except such
transactions. Whether or not the intention of the legislature, to give the
bona fide purchaser obtaining the certificate clear and conclusive evidence
of his rights and ownership in the chattel, necessitates the loss of the out-
of-state owner's interest is a consideration which is debatable. The dis-
sent also argues that as the Registrar may cancel those certificates
wrongfully obtained,' 5 this section applies to the problem considered here
and resolves it in favor of the owner.
It must be remembered that the ruling is intended to deal exclusively
with automobiles. A car is an exceptionally mobile chattel and may
require special treatment. Perhaps social ends are better served by
placing a burden of loss upon foreign finance and insurance companies
which can more easily shift it, especially since thefts are dearly taken
care of by the act. Perhaps, further, the better policy in the case of the
automobile is to protect the bona fide purchaser, thus affecting a safer,
quicker market for automobiles, and in this manner even protecting
the used-car dealers who felt themselves injured by the act's two-fold
purpose."
An interesting problem arises when state B feels it should exercise
control and does so by granting a new tide, and later the chattel is
removed to state C. There seems to be conflict as to whether state C
R EsTrTEMENT, CONYLXCT oF LAWS, Sec. 268, comment d. This refers to liens in
the second state such as those of mechanics or for salvage and does not refer to dealings
xith the title.
'See note 3, supra.
qThiering v. Gage, 13z Ore. 9z, Z84 Pac. 832 (193) (not void per se); Parrot v.
Gulick, 145 Okla. sz9, z9z Pac. 48 (1930). Contra: Kimber v. Eding, z6z Mich. 670,
247 NAV. 777 ('933)-
"See note 5, supra.
b See note 8, supra.
" See note z, supra.
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then must enforce the title gained in state B or that of state A. 7 The
question is usually further complicated by the fact that no new trans-
action has occurred in state C."8 Some of the writers have felt this
involves a question of due process and full faith and credit under the
Federal Constitution.' 9 The problem of the action of other states
toward the new Ohio title is, therfore, one which Ohio courts should
not overlook.20  A.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL LIBERTIES - PEACEABLE
ASSEMBLY- VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE REQUIRING
DISPERSAL OF CROWD
Defendant was convicted of violating a village ordinance which pro-
vided: "That it shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble
. . . on any of the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys or parks . . . or
to refuse or neglect, on being notified by the Marshall or Police Officer
to do so, to forthwith quietly disperse." The facts showed that defendant
and a few friends had been standing on a sidewalk, ostensibly behaving
themselves in a quiet manner, the only basis of conviction being the
refusal to "move on" at the police officer's command. The Court of
Common Pleas of Hamilton County reversed the conviction and held
the ordinance unconstitutional as being repugnant to the guarantee of
peaceable assembly found in Article I, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment.'
In the past, although a few jurisdictions have invalidated legislative
exertions of similar character on grounds of infringement of state con-
stitutional guaranties,2 such ordinances have generally been sustained
as valid exercises of municipal police power. Thus the municipal power
to prevent obstruction of traffic,' to abate nuisances, 4 to prevent breaches
'1 Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. ISS (x928) refused to recognize
the new title, on the basis of reciprocity; but see Edgerly v. Bush, Si N. Y. gg (iSso).
Contra: Fuller v. Webster, 5 Boyce 538, 95 A. 335, (Del. 1915).
'Leflor, Jurisdiction Over Tangible Chattels, (937), z U. Mo. L. Rrv. 171; also
see note 9, supra.
a' Dodd, Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of
Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. Rev. 533; Ross, Has The Conflict of Laws Become
a Branch of Constitutional Law? (931) 25 MINN. L. REv. z6s.
0 Generally see Carnahan, Tangibles In The Conflict of Laws, (1935) Z U. OF CHI.
L. Rav. 345-
'Deer Park (Village) v. Schuster, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 466, 16 Ohio Op. 485 (1940).
'State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 29o, 113 AtI. 385 (z922); State v. Hunter, io6 N.C.
796, i S.E. 366, 8 L.R.A. 529 (289o).
'People v. Pierce, 85 App. Div. 125, 83 N.Y.S. 79 (1903).
' Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164. N.E. 480 (929).
